CJEU on Article 3 Maintenance Regulation (subrogation – public body)

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑540/19 (WV v Landkreis Harburg) which is about Article 3 (b) of the Maintenance Regulation. The decision should have a clear practical impact: « A public body which seeks to recover, by way of an action for recovery, sums paid in place of maintenance to a maintenance creditor, and to which the claims of that maintenance creditor against the maintenance debtor have been transferred by way of subrogation, may validly invoke the jurisdiction of the court for the place where the creditor is habitually resident, as provided in Article 3(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations”.

Source: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=231185&mode=req&pageIndex=1&dir=&occ=first&part=1&text=&doclang=EN&cid=2561617

AG  Saugmandsgaard Øe on Article 7.2 Brussels I bis (private enforcement of competition law)

AG  Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered last week (10 September 2020) his opinion in case C‑59/19 (Wikingerhof GmbH & Co. KG contre Booking.com BV), which is about Brussels I bis. The opinion is currently available in selected EU official languages only (such as German and Spanish). It is not available in English. Here is the French version (to check whether an English translation has finally been made available, just click on the link below and change the language version):

“L’article 7, point 2, du règlement (UE) no 1215/2012 du Parlement européen et du Conseil, du 12 décembre 2012, concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale doit être interprété en ce sens qu’une action en responsabilité civile fondée sur la violation des règles du droit de la concurrence relève de la « matière délictuelle ou quasi délictuelle », au sens de cette disposition, y compris lorsque le demandeur et le défendeur sont parties à un contrat et que les prétendus agissements anticoncurrentiels que le premier reproche au second se matérialisent dans leur relation contractuelle ».

Source : here

New Decision from the ICCP

The International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris (France) delivered a few days ago (8 September 2020) a decision (RG 19/06635) on jurisdiction clauses.

Summary / Resumé: “This case involved a company incorporated under Belgian law and a company incorporated under Emirati law. The latter signed a letter of guarantee for its Gabonese subsidiary in favor of the Belgian company, thereby securing the performance of a telecommunications services contract signed between the Gabonese subsidiary and the Belgian company. This contract stipulated a jurisdiction clause in favor of the Paris courts. Although the Emirati company (the guarantor) did not sign the contract containing the jurisdiction clause, the International Commercial Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris decided that the French court had jurisdiction, considering that the said clause was enforceable against it in respect of the warranty action brought by the Belgian company.

The ICCP-CA held that the agreements, although distinct, were intimately linked, as one conditioned the second and vice versa. As a result, it found that both agreements constituted “the Agreement”, so that their existence and performance were only justified by the overall scheme of the operations. It considered that these two acts could be qualified as an indivisible contractual whole, as the parties had intended to include the two contracts in a single transaction, thus rendering the jurisdiction clause stipulated in the Agreement enforceable against the guarantor, which had, furthermore, expressly agreed to the “terms and conditions” and had therefore been aware of it ».

The decision (in French) is attached to this post. 

CJEU on Articles 1 and 24 Brussels I bis (immunity from enforcement)

The Court of Justice delivered on Thursday (3 September 2020) its judgment in case C‑186/19 (Supreme Site Services GmbH, and alii v Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) which is about Article 1 and 24 Brussels I bis (along with Article 35) in the context of an action brought by an international organisation based on immunity from execution seeking to have an interim garnishee order lifted and a prohibition on new orders being levied on the same grounds.

Background: “The request has been made in the course of proceedings between, on one hand, Supreme Site Services GmbH, established in Switzerland, Supreme Fuels GmbH & Co KG, established in Germany, and Supreme Fuels Trading Fze, established in the United Arab Emirates (together, ‘the Supreme companies’) and, on the other hand, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (‘SHAPE’ [NATO]), established in Belgium, concerning the lifting of an interim garnishee order”.

Decision: “1. Article 1(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 […] is to be interpreted as meaning that an action for interim relief brought before a court of a Member State in which an international organisation invokes its immunity from execution in order to obtain both the lifting of an interim garnishee order executed in a Member State other than that of the forum and a prohibition on levying such an order in the future on the same grounds, brought in parallel with substantive proceedings concerning a claim arising from alleged non-payment for fuel supplied for the purposes of a peacekeeping operation carried out by that organisation, is covered by the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’, in so far as that action is not pursued under public powers, within the meaning of EU law, which is a matter for the assessment of the referring court.

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Specific rules for posting drivers in the road transport sector

Directive (EU) 2020/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2020 laying down specific rules with respect to Directive 96/71/EC and Directive 2014/67/EU for posting drivers in the road transport sector and amending Directive 2006/22/EC as regards enforcement requirements and Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012  has been published today at the OJEU (L 249, 31.7.2020, p. 49).

Readers of this blog will be interested in particular by Article 1 paragraphs 1 to 9.

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LIBE Committee interim report on Poland and the rule of law

The Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (Rapporteur: Juan Fernando López Aguilar) released earlier this week (20 July 2020) its interim report on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835 – 2017/0360R(NLE)), PE650.665v03-00. You can read it here.

CJEU on Article 10 Rome III

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑249/19 (JE v KF), which is about Rome III.

Context: “11 JE and KF, who are Romanian nationals, married in Iași (Romania) on 2 September 2001.

12 On 13 October 2016, JE applied for a divorce to the Judecătoria Iași (Court of First Instance, Iași, Romania).

13 By judgment of 31 May 2017, that court declined jurisdiction to hear that application in favour of the Judecătoria Sectorului 5 București (Court of First Instance of the Fifth District of Bucharest, Romania).

14 By a judgment of 20 February 2018, that court, on the basis of the nationality of both spouses referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation No 2201/2003, established that the Romanian courts had general jurisdiction to hear the application for divorce made by JE. Furthermore, on the basis of Article 8(a) of Regulation No 1259/2010, it designated Italian law as the law applicable to the dispute of which it was seised, on the ground that, on the date on which the application for divorce was filed, the habitual residence of the spouses was in Italy.

15 In that regard, that court held that, under Italian law, an application for divorce made in circumstances such as those of the main proceedings could be filed only if a legal separation of the spouses had previously been established or declared by a court and if at least three years had elapsed between the date of that separation and the date on which the application for divorce was filed with the court.

16  Given that the existence of a court decision establishing or pronouncing such a separation had not been proven and that Romanian law does not provide for legal separation proceedings, that court held that those proceedings had to be conducted before the Italian courts and that, consequently, any application to that effect made to the Romanian courts was inadmissible.

17 JE lodged an appeal against that judgment before the referring court, claiming, inter alia, that the court at first instance should have applied Article 2600(2) of the Civil Code, which constitutes the transposition into Romanian law of Article 10 of Regulation No 1259/2010.

18 In that regard, JE is of the opinion that, since Italian law is restrictive as regards the conditions required for divorce, Romanian law should apply to the application for divorce.

19 In JE’s view, that solution also flows from the fact that the application of Italian law is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum and that, consequently, that application must, in accordance with Article 12 of that regulation, be disapplied”.

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CJEU on Article 3 Insolvency bis Regulation

The Court of Justice delivered today its judgment in case C‑253/19 (MH, NI v OJ, Novo Banco SA), which is about the Insolvency bis Regulation:

“The first and fourth subparagraphs of Article 3(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings must be interpreted as meaning that the presumption established in that provision for determining international jurisdiction for the purposes of opening insolvency proceedings, according to which the centre of the main interests of an individual not exercising an independent business or professional activity is his or her habitual residence, is not rebutted solely because the only immovable property of that person is located outside the Member State of habitual residence”.

Source: here